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Kogod v. Cioffi-Kogod, 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 9 (Apr. 25, 2019) (en banc)1 
 
DIVORCE AWARDS: ALIMONY AND UNEQUAL DISPOSITION OF COMMUNITY 
PROPERTY 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court articulated several decisions regarding the disposition of assets after a divorce. 
First, in determining an alimony award, a district court should consider the need of the receiving 
party in light of other income-earning property received. Second, extramarital spending can justify 
unequal disposition of community property; however, unequal disposition cannot be based on 
overconsumption of funds unless a specific showing is made to prove that consumption is 
excessive. Third, calculations of community property disposition should continue until the written 
decree is issued. Finally, a violation of an ambiguous injunction cannot result in sanctions. 
 
Background 
 
 The parties in this action, Dennis Kogod and Gabriella Cioffi-Kogod, married in 1991 and 
moved to Las Vegas in 2003. Dennis worked for a healthcare company in southern California. In 
2004, he was promoted to Chief Operating Officer of a Fortune 500 healthcare company; as a 
result, his average annual salary was $800,000. After his bonuses were calculated, his annual 
income approached $14,000,000. 
 According to Dennis, it was during this time that the couple began “living separate lives.” 
Dennis had secretly started a separate family in southern California with a woman named Nadya, 
although they never formally married. He told Nadya of his marriage to Gabrielle, yet Dennis and 
Nadya stayed together and had twin girls in 2007. Dennis paid for everything, such as luxury cars, 
vacations, Nadya’s college classes, and even an investment on behalf of Nadya. Dennis’s 
relationship with Nadya persisted until 2015 when Nadya discovered Dennis had another girlfriend  
in addition to his wife.  
 Dennis filed for divorce from Gabrielle in 2010; however, the action was dismissed and 
the couple informally separated the same year. Gabrielle, still unaware of Dennis’s secret family, 
filed for divorce in 2013. The community property in this case totaled $47 million. 
 The divorce decree was entered in August of 2016. First, $6 million was awarded to each 
party as separate property. The district court then divided the remaining $35 million of community 
property. First, the district court found that Dennis had dissipated just over $4 million of the 
community property, and they awarded Gabrielle $1.6 million dollars in alimony to offset loses 
involved with the marriage and the divorce. In total, Gabrielle received approximately $21 million 
in mostly cash assets and Dennis received approximately $14 million, most of which came in the 
form of real property. The final finding sanctioned Dennis $19,500 for violating a preliminary 
injunction and awarded Gabrielle $75,650 in fees. Dennis appealed and Gabrielle cross-appealed. 
This opinion is the result of the consolidated appeal. 
 
 
 
 
1  By Dallas Anselmo.  
Discussion 
 
II.  
 
 On his appeal, Dennis first challenged the alimony award to Gabrielle. The Court first 
explained the considerable discretion possessed by the district court when awarding alimony. The 
Court also highlighted statutes that guide district courts and require the consideration of eleven 
factors when awarding alimony.2 This decision-making process was stressed because of the 
“nebulous” purpose of alimony. This “nebulous” nature creates unpredictability for parties and can 
“leave courts uncertain as to when, and in what amount, alimony should be awarded.” 
 Arguments in this case highlighted the undefined nature of alimony. Dennis asserted 
financial need should limit alimony awards; Gabrielle responded by asserting alimony can serve 
as a tool to “equalize” earnings or maintain a lifestyle. 
 Responding to these arguments, the Court held that alimony can satisfy the “just and 
equitable” standard when it is based on economic needs of a spouse and when it is intended to 
“compensate for a spouse’s economic loses from the marriage and divorce, including to equalize 
post-divorce earnings or help maintain the marital standard of living.” In other words, the 
assertions of each party were accurate, but neither encompassed all considerations that make up 
an alimony analysis. 
 
A. 
 
 After announcing this ruling, the Court discussed a brief history of alimony. Nevada has 
recognized alimony as a remedy for “economic-power imbalance[s]” since its earliest cases. In 
some of those early cases, the need of the receiving spouse and the paying spouse’s ability to pay 
were the only factors considered. The Court distinguished this binary approach from the current 
approach outlined in NRS 125.150. Overall, and in light of the current approach, the Court 
articulates “a district court may award alimony to ensure that an economically powerless spouse 
receives sufficient support to meet his or her needs.” 
 The next issue is what qualifies as a “need,” especially in a case involving such wealth. 
When the receiving spouse needs assistance purchasing food and shelter, the need is “clear-cut” 
and an alimony award is of course appropriate. The Court again highlights the ambiguity that can 
be found when determining “needs”; however, the Legislature has placed this discretion with the 
trial courts. Ultimately, the ambiguity remains and it is the district court that must determine the 
meaning of “needs” and what is “just and equitable.” 
 
B. 
 
Beyond the need of the receiving spouse, alimony may also be awarded in order to 
compensate for a spouse’s loss in standard of living or earning capacity. For example, decreased 
earning potential as a result of “foregoing career opportunities for the sake of the marriage” may 
be considered.  
This rationale also supports the case law’s interest in maintaining the receiving spouse’s 
standard of living after the divorce. It is an “important aim” of the Supreme Court to allow the 
receiving spouse to “maintain a lifestyle as close as possible to the lifestyle enjoyed during the 
 
2  NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 125.150(1)(a), 125.150(9) (2017).  
marriage . . . .” The Court highlights how it has reaffirmed this goal in the past by defining two 
primary purposes of alimony: “to narrow any large gaps between the post-divorce earning 
capacities of the parties and to allow the recipient spouse to live ‘as nearly as fairly possible to the 
station in life [] enjoyed before the divorce.’”3 In sum, the Court disagrees with Dennis’s assertion 
that alimony may only be awarded to meet financial need. 
 
C. 
 
 In an attempt to narrow the earning gap between both parties, the district court initially 
awarded Gabrielle alimony of $18,000 a month to be paid over nine years. The district court 
ordered a lump sum be paid from the community property and “discounted the award by a four 
percent average rate of return.” As a result, Gabrielle received a payment of $1,630,292. Gabrielle 
asserted that the alimony was necessary to narrow the wage gap and allow her to maintain her 
standard of living.  
In a footnote, the Court noted that Gabrielle’s assertion focuses on the only two remaining 
grounds for alimony. Because Gabrielle’s nursing career was flexible with moves to accommodate 
Dennis’s occupation, she “did not forgo career opportunities” as a result of the marriage. Because 
no career opportunities were missed, standard of living and wage gap reduction constituted the 
other two grounds upon which Gabrielle could request alimony. 
 
1. 
 
By itself, income disparity cannot mandate alimony. Gabrielle was correct, the Court held, 
in stating alimony can be instituted for the purpose of narrowing the wage gap; however, the Court 
held that the property Gabrielle received eliminated the need for awarding alimony. Even though 
the award will not directly supplement her earnings, there is no need for an alimony award because 
Gabrielle can earn substantial passive income from the assets she received. This earning potential 
is greater than the amount of the original alimony order; therefore, the Court disagrees with 
Gabrielle’s assertion that she requires the alimony. Ultimately, alimony to “achieve parity in 
income” must also advance another rationale for alimony.  
 
2. 
 
 Again, the Court held that Gabrielle was correct in her assertion that alimony is valid when 
it helps the receiving spouse maintain their standard of living; however, other awards must be 
considered when determining the receiving spouse’s ability to maintain their standard of life. “It 
would be the height of absurdity to suggest that a spouse, to whom income-producing property 
was awarded in a property settlement, would be entitled to have his or her need for alimony, or 
ability to pay alimony, determined without regard to the income produced by that property.”4 
Principles of alimony “do not contemplate an award for a spouse” who is capable of supporting 
herself and able to maintain her standard of life. Summarily, the Court found the district court had 
abused its discretion when it awarded alimony and it reversed. In so doing, the Court rejected 
Gabrielle’s cross-appeal requesting a larger alimony award.  
 
 
3  Shydler v. Shydler, 114 Nev. 192, 198, 954 P.2d 37, 40 (1998).   
4  Lang v. Lang, 425 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).  
III. 
 
 A court must equally dispose of community property in a divorce unless a compelling 
reason exists that supports an unequal distribution.5 Dissipation or waste can be a compelling 
reason that can justify an unequal disposition.  
 Dennis dissipated just over $4 million dollars of the community property, much of which 
related to Dennis’s secret family and children. Both parties contest the district court’s finding 
regarding the amount dissipated. Dennis contends he did not dissipate any property because the 
marital estate actually grew “tremendously.” Gabrielle responded by asserting the district court 
erred in its calculations. 
 
A. 
 
There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the district court when it found a compelling 
reason to unequally disperse the community property in response to Dennis’s extramarital 
spending. The Court was not persuaded by Dennis’s argument that the extramarital spending was 
harmless because the estate’s overall value increased. 
The Court distinguished case law that provided “spousal abuse or marital misconduct is a 
compelling reason to make an unequal disposition of community assets only when it has an 
‘adverse economic impact’ on the [receiving] spouse.”6 The “adverse economic impact” 
requirement in Wheeler is necessary because the Court in that case was deciding whether to 
unequally disperse assets as a result of uneconomic activity: spousal abuse.  
The relationship between physical abuse and the community property in Wheeler was much 
more tenuous than the relationship between the extramarital spending of assets and the community 
property in this case. Here, there is a clear relationship between the asset expenditure and the 
community assets. This clear relationship caused the Court to be unpersuaded by Dennis’s overall 
estate growth theory. 
 
B. 
 
Dennis conveyed $72,200 worth of gifts to family members prior to the divorce. Whether 
a gift constitutes dissipation pivots on the existence of an injunction or the nature and timing of 
the gift. First, when a pre-divorce gift violates an injunction, it constitutes dissipation and can 
justify unequal distribution of community property.7  
Without a specific injunction, a gift to family does not constitute dissipation unless the gift 
is (1) given at a suspicious time prior to the divorce or is (2) suspiciously large when compared to 
prior gifts. Using this analysis, the Court held the district court appropriately found the $72,200 
conveyed by Dennis constituted dissipation.  
 
C. 
 
 Dennis could not account for all of his expenditures in the months leading up to the divorce, 
so the district court classified these expenditures as “potential waste.” Dennis promised to provide 
 
5  NEV. REV. STAT. 125.150(1)(b) (2017).  
6  Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 113 Nev. 1185, 1190, 946 P.2d 200, 203 (1997). 
7  Lofgren v. Lofgren, 112 Nev. 1282, 1283, 926 P.2d 296, 297 (1996).  
a forensic accountant to make sense of the unclassified expenditures; however, he failed to do so. 
Gabrielle then provided her own forensic accountant. The district court required Dennis to 
“account for each of these [] transactions . . . .” The Court held the district court erred by requiring 
this of Dennis. 
 An additional consideration is required when examining expenditures made by high-
income individuals. Expenditures by wealthy individuals, like Dennis, especially when viewed in 
the aggregate, appear indicative of waste. However, it is possible the expenditures were mere 
overconsumption. Overconsuming community property is not a compelling reason that supports 
unequal disposition. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court’s unequal disposition of 
property because of the insufficient showing that expenditures “not elsewhere classified” actually 
constituted waste. 
 
D. 
 
 The Court agreed with Gabrielle’s assertion that the district court erred when it ended its 
community property calculations in February of 2016 instead of when the decree was entered in 
August of the same year. An “oral pronouncement of divorce” does not “terminate the 
community.” Calculations of the community property should continue until the community is 
terminated. Because calculations should have continued for another six months, this issue was 
remanded to the district court for further calculations and determinations of waste.  
 
IV. 
 
 The next issue concerns the sanctions placed on Dennis as a result of expenditures that 
violated the joint preliminary injunction that required all spending be made for the “usual course 
of business or for the necessities of life.” Given the wealth in this case, the meaning of “usual 
course of business or for the necessities of life” was found to be ambiguous. Before placing 
sanctions on a party, the order they allegedly violate must be clear and unambiguous.8  
 Therefore, the ambiguity in the order led the Court to hold sanctions were an inappropriate 
remedy altogether. The appropriate remedy would have been an unequal disposition of community 
property. Accordingly, the Court reversed the sanctions and denied Gabrielle’s appeal for 
additional sanctions. 
 
V. 
 
 The next award at issue was the $75,650 awarded to Gabrielle to help offset her forensic 
accountant fees when Dennis failed to provide a forensic accountant of his own. The district court 
ordered this award without any “apparent basis.” A district court must state a basis for its decision 
to award fees.9 Because no basis was given, the district court abused its discretion and the award 
of fees to Gabrielle was reversed; additionally, her appeal for attorney fees was denied. 
 
 
 
 
 
8  Cunningham v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 102 Nev. 551, 559–60, 729 P.2d 1328, 1333–34 (1986).  
9  Khoury v. Seastrand, 132 Nev. 520, 541, 377 P.3d 81, 95 (2016). 
Hardesty, J., with whom Stiglich, J., agrees, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
 
 Justices Hardesty and Stiglich write separately to express their disagreement with one part 
of the majority holding: the reversal of the alimony award. First, the dissenting justices felt that 
the majority failed to show sufficient deference to the trial court. Second, the dissent takes issue 
with the majority’s initial statement that alimony is without an official purpose only to later 
summarize Nevada alimony jurisprudence and seemingly assign a purpose for alimony. Third, the 
majority opinion speculates, without making any citation to the record, that the district court’s 
alimony award “could have been improperly motivated by Dennis’s marital indiscretions . . . .” 
The dissenting justices also pointed to the record and acknowledged the trial court’s use of the 
eleven factors found in NRS 125.150(9).  
Summarily, the dissenting justices are of the opinion that the combination of a deferential 
standard of review and the “thorough and specific” analysis of NRS 125.150(9) should have 
resulted in the affirmation of the alimony award. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded one issue with instructions. 
First, the alimony award was reversed because Gabrielle’s award from the community property 
was capable of earning income sufficient to offset the wage gap and maintain her standard of 
living. Second, the unequal dispersal of community property was affirmed as it related to Dennis’s 
extramarital spending; however, it was reversed regarding his consumption that was not 
definitively shown to be waste. Third, the case was remanded for calculations of the community 
property for the sixth months between the oral decree and the official written decree. Finally, the 
sanctions placed upon Dennis and the award of costs to Gabrielle were reversed.  
 
